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XI. LABOR
A. Producers and Associates Are Not Employees Under NLRA
The Producers Guild of America (PGA)' has fought a long and
hard battle for unionization against the management of various televi-
sion and motion picture production companies.2 One of the many ob-
stacles faced by the PGA was the California Court of Appeals. In
January 1974, the court invalidated PGA's last industry-wide contract,3
thus temporarily stopping its attempts at entering into a collective bar-
gaining agreement with management.
In its most recent attempt at unionization the PGA, in January of
1983, took its case to the Regional Director of the National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB). Twenty PGA members testified that producers
and associate producers are in fact employees within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and thus are entitled to col-
lectively bargain. Such testimony was in opposition to management's
claim that these producers were managers and supervisors and thus
barred from unionizing. 4 At an administrative hearing, NLRB Re-
1. The PGA is made up of approximately 800 producers and associate producers from
throughout the country, many of whom have previous experience as writers and directors.
Although the PGA requires that its members be either a producer or associate producer, it
does not bar them from membership in other guilds or unions. Therefore, producers and
associate producers, who among themselves are prohibited from unionizing, can enjoy the
benefits of collective bargaining if they are employed with another labor organization, as
long as such employment is not in a producer or associate producer capacity. Alliance of
Motion Picture and Television Producers and Its Member Cos. v. Producers Guild of
America, Inc., NLRB Case No. 3 1-RC-5435 (Apr. 15, 1983).
2. The Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers (AMPTP) opposed the
PGA's attempts at unionization. The AMPTP is made up of the following member compa-
nies: Aaron Spelling Productions, Inc.; Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.; Consolidated
Film Industries; Deluxe Laboratories, Inc.; Embassy Television/Tandem Productions, Inc.;
Lorimar Productions, Inc.; MTM Enterprises, Inc.; Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Film Company;
Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Film Laboratory; Movie Lab, Hollywood, Inc.; Paramount Pictures
Corporation; Talent and Production Payments, Inc.; Techicolor, Inc.; the Burbank Studios;
the Ladd Company; the Leonard Goldberg Company; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corpo-
ration; United Artists Corporation; Universal Studios, Inc.; Walt Disney Productions, Inc.;
Warner Brothers, Inc.; and Metromedia Producers Corporation. Producers Guild of
America, supra note 1, at 12.
3. In Knopf v. Producers Guild of America Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 323, 144 Cal. Rptr.
782 (1974), the California Court of Appeals held that the collective bargaining agreement
between the PGA and the AMPTP was invalid because the PGA was dominated by "em-
ployers" who are barred from entering into collective bargaining agreements by Section 7 of
the National Labor Relation's Act.
4. See generally The Daily Reporter, April 19, 1983, at I, col. 4 and The Hollywood
Reporter, April 19, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
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gional Director Roger Goubeaux turned down the PGA's petition for
unionization, finding, among other things, that the producers and asso-
ciate producers often share in the profits of productions, manage
financial, physical and technical aspects of the production, represent
management and engage in the supervision of various employees.5
Such findings led Goubeaux to hold that producers and associate pro-
ducers were both managers and supervisors under rules provided by
the Act6 and thus were prohibited from unionizing.
The PGA appealed the Regional Director's decision to the Head
Office of the NLRB in Washington, D.C. A three-member panel voted
unanimously to reject the appeal on the ground that it did not raise any
substantial issues sanctioning a review of the decision, thus ending the
PGA's bid for union status, as the right to appeal had been exhausted.7
The NLRA gives all "employees" the federal right to self-organ-
ize. The Act provides in pertinent part:
[Elmployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection...8
Section 2(3) of the Act defines "employees" as including all employees
except those hired as supervisors.9
The evidence showed that producers are responsible for the super-
vision of the creative, financial and technical areas of film production
and post production. Associate producers act on the direct authority
bestowed upon them by the producers. They are free to perform duties
on their own or to supervise those duties delegated to them by the
producer.o
Both producers and associate producers are hired by an employer
prior to the commencement of general employment for the production.
Producers often supervise writers in the development of the screenplay,
5. See generally Alliance, supra note 1.
6. Section 2( 1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) 1980, states: "[t]he term "supervi-
sor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."
7. The Daily Variety, July 1, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
8. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1980).
9. Id at § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1980).
10. See generally Alliance, supra.
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prepare itemized budgets for approval by executives of the employer
and are responsible for all costs regarding the physical production of
the film. The producers negotiate and are responsible for much of the
costs of leased facilities, set construction, wardrobe, labor and materi-
als, script, makeup and hair styling, trucking and post production
costs. '
Producers report to management on a daily basis and in turn relay
information back to the film set. The primary responsibility of the pro-
ducers and the associate producers is to insure that all phases of the
production keep within their budget limits by restricting expenditures,
diverting amounts budgeted from one department to another and ap-
proving day to day production expenditures.'
2
The producers and associate producers are actively involved in the
actual filming of a picture. They routinely review daily filming and can
order refilming; the directors, writers and editors are under the supervi-
sion of the producer. The post production work of dubbing and final
cuts are also the responsibility of the producers. The record shows that
producers and associate producers are often responsible for the hiring
of directors, associate directors, production managers, art directors,
writers, crew, composers, stage managers, actors, cast, set directors,
wardrobe personnel, stage managers, script supervisors, makeup and
hair artists, and production office personnel.'
3
In addition, producers have had authority to impose discipline, in-
cluding the firing of personnel, handling work schedule and payroll
problems and disputes between directors and stars. 4
For the above reasons and under the holding of Writers Guild of
America West Inc.,"5 the regional director held that producers are su-
pervisors within the meaning of the Act.
The PGA asserted that producers and associate producers are not
managerial employees. Managerial employees are those who are:
(1) so closely related to or aligned with management as to place them-
selves in a position of potential conflict of interest between the em-
ployer and his fellow workers, or (2) are engaged in formulating,
determining and effectuating the employer's policies or (3) have discre-
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. In Writers Guild of America West Inc., 217 NLRB 957, the NLRB held that execu-
tive producers, producers and associate producers are supervisors within the meaning of the
NLRA.
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tion, independent of an employer's established policy, in the perform-
ance of duties. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. 16
The record clearly indicates that producers and associate produ-
cers effectuate management policies, by controlling both the aspects of
the production and the methods in achieving the desired results of stu-
dio management. Producers exercise independent judgment regarding
schedules, locale, film direction and quality, length and what facilities
will be used in the post production. They engage in negotiating
financial arrangements, leases, the budgeting of funds, the salaries of
those they hire, and are sometimes given a share in a percentage of the
profits of production.'7
Producers and associate producers are considered "arms of man-
agement." They often formulate and implement management policy.
The threat of their being exploited by management is minimal.' 8
The federal right to self-organization was designed to combat ex-
ploitation of workers by management. Since producers and associate
producers are essentially "managerial" employees, their attempt to self-
organize is of little or no merit. The Act explicitly excludes "supervi-
sory" employees from the right to self-organization. Specific statutory
lanaguage is necessary to implement such an inclusion.
The decision by the NLRB has effectively stopped PGA's attempt
at unionization. Other groups contemplating unionization should take
notice of the regional director's finding to determine whether they too
will fall into the managerial and supervisory category. As this decision
indicates, the Act did not intend "arms of management" to unionize,
but instead intended to protect those groups of workers who were not
afforded autonomy and were in a position to be exploited. Producers
and associate producers are not members of the class of employees that
the Act intended to protect. To allow producers and associate produ-
cers to collectively bargain would defeat the purpose of the NLRA.
Bob Nunez
B. Standup Comedians Are Independent Contractors
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Maurice Miller, found that
stand-up comedians regularly performing in the Comedy Store are in-
16. 207 NLRB 341, 345.
17. See generally Alliance, supra.
18. Id
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dependent contractors, and therefore, not protected by the National
Labor Relations Act.'
The Comedy Store is a night-club, where comedians perform
stand-up routines for club patrons. In addition to entertaining the cus-
tomers of the Comedy Store, comedians also develop their comedy rou-
tines and, with the help of the owner, have their talent observed by
major producers which may result in significant advancements to their
careers. Comedians regard the Comedy Store as "the only game in
town," where their acts can be developed and given exposure to televi-
sion and other media producers.2
Prior to May, 1979, the majority of the Comedy Store performers
were not paid for their services. Only big name comedians were com-
pensated.3 In March, 1979, comedians of the Comedy Store organized
into the Comedians for Compensation (CFC), and on March 27, the
CFC called a strike against the Comedy Store. On May 3, 1979, an
agreement was reached with the Comedy Store and the CFC where the
comedians would return to work for a minimum compensation rate.4
On July 3, CFC changed its name to the American Federation of Co-
medians (AFC) and passed articles of association, by-laws for the
union, and specified the amount of annual dues to be paid.'
On July 17, 1979, the Comedy Store threatened to withdraw recog-
nition of the AFC and rescind the agreement.' Confronted with this
threat, the AFC voted unanimously to assign its bargaining rights to
the American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA).7 The AGVA was held
to be the proper bargaining representative for the comedians of the
Comedy Store."
The Comedy Store claimed that it was not obligated to bargain
with the AGVA because the comedians represented by the AGVA were
independent contractors, not employees of the Comedy Store. The
AGVA filed an unfair labor practice action against the Comedy Store
for failure to bargain with the proper representative of the comedians.9
This hearing before the ALJ was in response to this complaint.
I. The Comedy Store, Case No. 31-CA-9219, -10067 (Dec. 16, 1982); summarily af-
firmed 265 NLRB 183 (1982).
2. The Comedy Store, Case No. 31-CA-9219, -10067, pages 27-28 (Dec. 16, 1982).
3. Id at 22.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id. at 8-9.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 11.
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1,3,5) (West 1976). NLRA § 8(a)(5).
1984]
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Independent contractors are not protected by the National Labor
Relations Act.'° Therefore, in order for the Comedy Store to have an
obligation to bargain with the AGVA, the comedians must be deter-
mined to be employees of the Comedy Store. To determine whether
these comedians were employees or independent contractors of the
Comedy Store, the ALJ used the common law agency test of the right
to control the "means" as well as the "result" of the work performed. 1'
In applying this test, the ALJ reviewed all aspects of employment at the
Comedy Store.
To become a regular performer at the Comedy Store, a comedian
must audition with the owner of the Comedy Store. Successful audi-
tions are given regular "spots" (performance times). The sole judge of
the auditions is the owner.' 2 Comedians advance by being given more
popular times, and this advancement is at the sole discretion of the
owner.13
Comedians are expected to be on time for their performances, and
if late, could be subject to discipline. 4 Generally, discipline takes the
form of fewer performance slots or slots poorly valued by comedians
for their lack of attendance or exposure.15
The comedians were directly responsible for developing and refin-
ing their routines, providing their own costumes and props, and writing
the content and order of their jokes.' 6 However, the owner of the Com-
edy Store could suggest the content and style of a comedians perform-
ance.'7 If the comedian disregarded the advice of the owner,
termination could result.'8 The owner also required the comedians to
attend group sessions, and if these sessions were not attended, the co-
median could be subject to discipline.' 9 The comedians, however, did
their own advertising;20 some worked for night clubs other than the
Comedy Store;2' and others had full-time day jobs.22 Furthermore,
when the comedians were paid, no taxes or deductions were withdrawn
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (West 1976).
11. The Comedy Store at 37.
12. Id at 14.
13. Id. at 48-49.
14. Id. at 17.
15. Id at 28.
16. Id. at 18.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 31.
19. Id at 20.
20. Id. at 32.
21. Id. at 23.
22. Id at 35.
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from their checks. 23
The ALJ found that the owner of the Comedy Store had the right
to control the means of the performance as well as the result sought.24
In language consistent with the Restatement ofAgency defini-
tion, previously noted, the ongoing relationship between Re-
spondent's [the Comedy Store] proprietor and Respondent's
recognized "regular" performers, described and defined
within the present record, reflects-so I find-their shared un-
derstanding and consequent tacit "agreement" that Ms. Shore
[owner of the Comedy Store], realistically, possesses a right of
control which she "may exercise" with regard to "details"
which, within her view, have affected, or might affect, their
comedy performances.25
Although the ALJ found that the common law principles of
agency determined that the relationship of the comedians to the Com-
edy Store was that of an employer/employee,26 the ALJ did not rest his
holding on that issue. He included all aspects of employment at the
Comedy Store,27 including an analysis of "the societal consensus" (a
novel factor which he does not support by case or statute).28 Notably
however, the ALJ did not consider policy factors or economic realities
in his analysis of this case.29 The ALJ concluded that comedians form
a distinct occupation and display distinct "entreprenurial" characteris-
tics, and held that comedians working for the Comedy Store are in-
dependent contractors, not employees of the Comedy Store. Therefore,
the NLRB had no jurisdiction over this dispute.
30
The immediate result of this decision is that the comedians and
regular night club performers are not protected by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). The Comedy Store, therefore, can repudiate its
agreement with the performers without liability to the NLRB. The
ALJ is not unaware of this result nor with the injustice involved. The
23. Id. at 27.
24. Id at 50-51.
25. Id at 54.
26. Id. at 50-51.
27. Id at 35.
28. Id. at 40. This is truely a novel factor apparently based upon Marcus Aurelius,
Meditations. Id. at 58. Although it is not the intention of this author to dispute the wisdom
of the Second Century Roman Empiror/Philosopher, his work is not binding authority. It is
also notable that Aurelius' son, the recipient of Meditations, began the political decline that
ended in the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. It is sincerely hoped that this contin-
ued use by decision makers today, will not have a similar result.
29. The Comedy Store at 43.
30. Id at 59-60.
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ALJ sees that a wrong may be done, and that a remedy may be needed,
"but which this board, functioning within its proper jurisdictional
sphere, cannot provide-that remedy must, obviously be pursued by
some other forum.
' 3 1
However, The Comedy Store, read in conjunction with Hilton Int'l
Co. v. NLRB,32 makes it appear that no performer would be protected
by the NLRA Until the NLRB or the Supreme Court act, performers
will continue to be separated into two classes. Those performers who
are successful will be able to earn an adequate income at their chosen
profession. But, beginning, local, or undiscovered performers will be
forced to accept whatever measure of compensation night clubs or ho-
tels wish to provide. By the nature of their jobs, performers do not
neatly fall into easily definable classes of employees. However, per-
formers are as dependent upon their paychecks as are the easily defina-
ble classes of employees. This is an unfortunate "economic reality"
which appears to address the purpose of the National Labor Relations
Act.
3 3
The determination of "employee" or "independent contractor"
status is to be achieved according to the common-law principles of
agency.34 However, economic and policy matters are still to be consid-
ered when determining the status of workers as employees or independ-
ent contractors for purposes of the application of the NLRA35 The
inclusion of "societal consensus" is a unique factor used to determine
agency, a method however, which lacks authority and a concrete
method of determination. "Societal consensus" seems to mean no
more than what the ALJ considers to be an appropriate bargaining
unit.
In common law agency questions, agency is determined by the
amount of control which can be exercised, not the amount of control
actually exercised 6.3  Among the rights most indicative of control is the
31. Id at 60.
32. Hilton International Co. v. N.L.R.B., 690 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1982).
33. N.L.R.A. section 1; 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 1976). "The inequality of bargaining
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce,. . . by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabiliza-
tion of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries." Id
34. NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
35. Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S.
157, 168 (1971).
36. Lorenz Schneider Co. Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 517 F.2d 445, 449 (2d Cir. 1975).
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right of an employer to terminate his employee.37 The Comedy Store
retained this right to terminate.38 This factor was not addressed by the
ALJ
The employment status of the comedians at the Comedy Store is
not entirely clear. The ALJ could have justified his decision on the
basis of the common law agency test. However, by finding the comedi-
ans to be employees under the common law agency test, and independ-
ent contractors under "other" factors (including "societal consensus"),
the ALJ departed from accepted methods of employment consideration
which resulted in a wrong doing without a remedy.39 Notably, the
common law agency test is meant to include all factors of employ-
ment,' but the A.L.J. justified his departure from the common law
agency test in order to consider "all factors" of employment.4'
This wrong should be able to be remedied by the wide discretion
of agency law and the latitude given by consideration of economic real-
ity and policy consideration used to determine employee status under
the NLRA42 Until the NLRB or the circuit courts affirm performers'
rights to organize for collective bargaining, performers only compensa-
tion will exist in the form of audience applause and laughter, unfortu-
nately, not acceptable to landlords or grocery stores.
Christopher Mclntire
C. Hotel Musicians Are Not Employees Under the NLRA
The Second Circuit, in Hilton International v. NLRB,' held that
musicians employed for steady engagements by Hotels of the Puerto
Rico Hotel Association are not employees of the hotels. This denies the
musicians protection under the National Labor Relations Act.2
In 1979, the Federacion de Musicos de Puerto Rico, Local 468,
filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Puerto Rico Hotel As-
sociation and Hilton International Company for their refusal to bar-
gain with the representatives of musicians employed for steady
37. Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp., 21 Cal. App. 3d 541, 550, 98 Cal. Rptr. 588, 593
(1971).
38. The Comedy Store at 31.
39. Id at 60.
40. Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 370-372, 232 P.2d 241, 249-250 (1951).
41. The Comedy Store at 59.
42. 404 U.S. at 168.
1. Hilton International Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1982).
2. NLRA § 8(a)(5); 28 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(5) (West 1976).
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engagements.3 This refusal to bargain with the representatives would
have violated section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).4
Musicians hired for steady engagements typically play for more
than one week,5 some for periods in excess of one year.6 The hotels
determine the working hours and locations where the bands play. At
times, the hotels would determine what types of music played and de-
termine the size of the bands.' The Hilton Hotel Co. also controlled
the conduct of the musicians in order to protect their customers. 8 Ho-
tels paid the band members individually through an employee check
which would withhold payroll taxes.9
The Administrative Law Judge found that band leaders of long
term engagement bands were hotel supervisors, not independent con-
tractors, and that the musicians themselves were hotel employees.' °
The Administrative Law Judge also found the Federacion de Musicos
de Puerto Rico to be the proper bargaining representative of the musi-
cians; therefore, the hotel's refusal to bargain with the union violated
section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA" The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) summarily adopted the findings of the Administrative Law
Judge and required the Hotel Association to comply with the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's order.' 2 The Second Circuit, Justice Cardamone,
reversed. 13
Independent contractors are not protected by the NLRA.14 There-
fore, in order for the Hotel Association to be obligated to bargain with
the representative of the musicians, the musicians must first be found to
be employees of the hotel.
To determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor, principles of agency law are applied. 5 Generally, if the
employer can control the manner and means of accomplishing the de-
3. 690 F.2d at 319.
4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(5) (West 1976).
5. 690 F.2d at 319.
6. Id. at 322.
7. Id at 321.
8. Id
9. Id at 322.
10. Id at 320.
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id at 323.
14. 28 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (West 1976).
15. NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).
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sired result, an employer/employee relationship exists. 16 Although
there is no definitive test to determine a worker's status, the more de-
tailed the supervision, the more likely that an employer/employee rela-
tionship is being maintained. ' 7 Yet, if the only control exercised is over
the result sought, an independent contractor status is likely.'
8
Factors used to determine whether an employee/employer rela-
tionship exists are:
(W)hether the proported employee is engaged in a distinct oc-
cupation or business; whether the work involved is usually
done under an employer's direction or by an unsupervised
specialist; the skill involved; who supplied the instrumentali-
ties and place of employment; the method of payment (by the
time or by the job); whether the work is part of the employer's
regular business and/or necessary to it; and the intent of the
parties creating the relationship."
The Second Circuit found that the control the hotels had included:
requiring certain types of music, working hours of the musicians, per-
formance location, size of the bands (to produce a certain type of
sound), and conduct of the musicians. However, the court held that the
means of accomplishing the desired result was in the hands of the band
leaders.2 °
The band leaders hired, terminated, instructed, and disciplined the
band members.2' Although musicians were paid from the same payroll
service as admitted employees of the hotel and taxes were deducted
from the paychecks, the bands usually contracted in advance for a spe-
cific amount of payment.22 Furthermore, musicians were not entitled
to the same personnel practices and disciplinary rules that pertained to
regular hotel employees.23
Other factors considered by the court included: bands were usu-
ally contracted through booking agents;24 some bands had outside per-
16. 690 F.2d at 320.
17. Id
18. Lorenz Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445, 449 (2d Cir. 1975). In Lorenz, the
Lorenz Schneider Co. offered to sell franchises to its employees rather than maintain the
employer/employee relationship. The employees accepted this offer. The NLRB deter-
mined that the franchisees were still employees for purposes of the NLRA. The Second
Circuit reversed.
19. 690 F.2d at 320-321; see e.g. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2).
20. 690 F.2d at 321.
21. Id.
22. Id at 322.
23. Id. at 321.
24. Id.
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formances with other night clubs or television performances;25 the
bands usually provided their own instruments; 26 and hotels can not ter-
minate an individual band member, only the entire band.27
Upon careful consideration, we find that although there is
some evidence to support the Board's determination, it does
not constitute substantial evidence when viewing the record as
a whole. The evidence instead establishes with sufficient cer-
tainty that the band leaders are independent contractors who
employ the musicians who perform in the bands.28
The result for the entertainment field is that only big name bands
will be able to make an adequate living as musicians. Musicians in
local bands, deprived of their power to bargain for their wages and
conditions of employment, will have to accept whatever compensation
the hotels wish to make. Individual musicians in the Second Circuit
will fall into two classes; those in big name bands with adequate earn-
ings, and those in little known or local bands unable to influence the
amount of their compensation.
In common law agency questions, the issue presented is not the
amount of control exercised, but the amount of control which can be
exercised. 29 Among the rights most indicative of control, is the right to
terminate for cause.3° The hotels retained the right to prescribe the
conduct of the musicians and apparently retained the right to control
bands by the threat of termination.3 These factors do not appear to
have been given proper consideration by the Second Circuit.
The court justified overturning the decision of the NLRB by the
decision of Associated Musicians of Greater Newark, Local 16.32 Yet,
Associated Musicians involved an entirely different question of law.
Associated Musicians dealt with the issue of whether the Associated
Musicians, Local 16, called an illegal strike against an employer. The
independent contractor status of musicians employed by the band
agents involved, Aimes and Herman, was not disputed.33 Aimes was a
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id.
28. Id at 323.
29. 517 F.2d at 449.
30. Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp., 21 Cal. App. 3d 541, 550, 98 Cal. Rptr. 588, 593
(1971).
31. 690 F.2d at 321.
32. Id. at 323; Associated Musicians of Greater Newark, Local 16, 206 NLRB 581
(1973).
33. 206 NLRB at 588.
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corporation whose activities engaged in providing bands to clients for
dances, bar mitzvahs, shows, etc.34 Sometimes, Aimes would provide
up to five bands per day for various performances.35 Herman was also
a corporation involved in the same activities as Aimes. Herman em-
ployed up to 12 orchestras as a time, and over 200 musicians. Herman
paid these musicians himself, deducted taxes from their checks, and
had individual contracts with his musicians.36 The Second Circuit
failed to note that the musicians under Aimes and Herman were con-
sidered employees of Aimes and Herman, not employees of the band
leaders.37 Associated Musicians supports the holding of the NLRB, not
the Second Circuit.
A further issue not addressed by the court in Hilton International is
the question of whether the hotel would be liable for an injury caused
by a musician. If the hotel would be liable for such an injury, the musi-
cians are employees of the hotel.3" Additionally, the court did not ex-
amine the special policy considerations and economic realities to be
taken into account when addressing the issue of agency in the context
of the NLRA Although common law agency standards are to be used
to determine a workers status, "(i)n doubtful cases, resort must still be
had to economic and policy considerations to infuse section 2(3) with
meaning.
39
The prior decision of the Second Circuit in Herald Co. v. NLRB4 °
conflicts with the decision of Hilton International. The Herald Co., a
newspaper publisher and distributor, refused to recognize and bargain
with the representatives of the distribution employees. The company
claimed the employees were independent contractors, not employees.
The distributors were free to hire substitutes and select delivery boys,
34. Id. at 584.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 584-585.
37. Id. at 588.
38. 517 F.2d at 452.
39. Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 168 (1971). In 1944, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S.
11 (1944), decided that the term "employee" was to be determined with reference to the
purpose of the N.L.R.A. and given wide application. Id at 129. Congress reacted to the
Court's decision by specific exclusions of independent contractors in the Taft-Hartley
Amendment in 1947. See N.L.R.A. § 2(3). The Supreme Court responded in United Insur-
ance by holding that common-law agency principles were to be used to determine an em-
ployee's status. See 390 U.S. at 256. However, "(a)lthough Hearst Publications was thus
repudiated, we do not think its approach has been totally discredited. In doubtful cases (sic)
resort must still be had to economic and policy considerations to infuse § 2(3) with mean-
ing." 404 U.S. at 168.
40. Herald Co. v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 945 (1971).
19841
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
plan their own work schedules, decide whether or not to extend credit
to their customers, and provide their own vehicles and transportation.
Distributors were not given any vacation, holiday, or fringe benefits by
the company and some distributors held other jobs. Yet, the Herald
could fine distributors for customer complaints, had exclusive control
over advertising, and exercised substantial control over the distributor's
immediate income. 4' The NLRB found the distributors were employ-
ees of the Herald Co., and the Second Circuit affirmed.42
The standard of review exercised by the court does not comport to
the standard of review established by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB
v. United Insurance Co. of America .4  A ruling by the NLRB should
not be set aside just because a court would decide the case differently.'
Even though the issue of agency requires no special administrative ex-
pertise, if presented with two conflicting views, the court should affirm
the finding of the NLRB. 45 The Second Circuit reversed because there
was a lack of substantial evidence of the decision of the NLRB. How-
ever, the Second Circuit recognized the basis for the NLRB's deci-
sion.46 Although there is not a specific definition for "substantial
evidence", substantial evidence is not to be interpreted in a manner
which would give the appellate court justification to reverse a holding
of the NLRB which the appellate court would have decided
differently.47
Hilton International, read in conjunction with Herald Co., makes it
difficult to determine what the Second Circuit would consider an ap-
propriate bargaining unit. The result is that employees organizing for
collective bargaining, especially in the entertainment industry, will be
unable to determine whether theirs is in appropriate bargaining unit
until their case is reviewed by the Second Circuit. The time delay and
extra cost of the appellate process will have the unfortunate effect of
discouraging employees from engaging in the risks of collective bar-
gaining. The Second Circuit reversed the NLRB on the basis of the
court's interpretation of "substantial evidence." Unfortunately, musi-
41. Id at 434.
42. Id. at 435.
43. 390 U.S. at 254.
44. Id at 260.
45. Id
46. 690 F.2d at 323.
47. 390 U.S. at 260.
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cians throughout the Second Circuit bear the cost of this court's termi-
nological application.
Christopher Mclntire

